We analyze linear McKean-Vlasov forward-backward SDEs arising in leader-follower games with mean-field type control and terminal state constraints on the state process. We establish an existence and uniqueness of solutions result for such systems in time-weighted spaces as well as a convergence result of the solutions with respect to certain perturbations of the drivers of both the forward and the backward component. The general results are used to solve a novel single-player model of portfolio liquidation under market impact with expectations feedback as well as a novel Stackelberg game of optimal portfolio liquidation with asymmetrically informed players.
Introduction and overview
Mean field games (MFGs) are a powerful tool to analyze strategic interactions in large populations when each individual player has only a small impact on the behavior of other players. Introduced independently by Huang, Malhamé and Caines [18] and Lasry and Lions [22] , MFGs have received considerable attention in the probability and stochastic control literature in the last decade. A probabilistic approach to solving MFGs was introduced by Carmona and Delarue in [11] . Using a maximum principle of Pontryagin type, they showed that solving the MFG reduces to solving a McKean-Vlasov forward-backward SDE (FBSDE) of form,
where X is the state of the representative player, Y is the adjoint variable, and L(·) denotes the law of a stochastic process. In MFGs with common noise [2, 3] the dependence of the coefficients on the law of the process (X, Y ) is of conditional form. FBSDEs of the form (1.1) also arise in mean-field control (MFC)
problems [1, 4, 12] and in MFGs with a major player [8, 9, 13] when formulating stochastic maximum principles. MFGs with a major player are a special class of leader-follower games with mean-field control.
In such a game, the leader's optimization problem can be viewed as MFC control problem where the state dynamics follows a controlled FBSDE that characterizes the representative minor agent's optimal response to the leader's control. We study a novel class of leader-follower games with mean-field control and terminal state constraint on the state processes that naturally arise in Stackelberg games of optimal portfolio liquidation with asymmetrically informed players.
McKean-Vlasov FBSDE with terminal state constraint
Let W = (W , W 0 ) be a multi-dimensional Brownian motion generating the filtration F = (F t ) t≥0 and let F 0 = (F 0 t ) t≥0 be the filtration generated by W 0 . In this paper, we consider linear McKean-Vlasov FBSDEs of the form     
with given initial and terminal condition for the forward, and unspecified terminal condition for the backward process. FBSDEs of this form arise in linear-quadratic MFGs, MFC problems, and leader-follower games under a terminal state constraint on the state process when formulating stochastic maximum principles. Under a terminal state constraint on the state sequence the terminal value of the adjoint process is unknown. The special case Λ 2 = Λ 3 = Λ 5 = f = g = 0 arises in the single player portfolio liquidation models under market impact studied in, e.g. [5, 17] . The special case Λ 2 = Λ 5 = f = g = 0 was recently analyzed in [14] in the framework of a MFG of optimal portfolio liquidation.
We prove a general existence and uniqueness of solutions result for the system (1.2) under boundedness assumptions on the model parameters that allows us to solve single player portfolio liquidation problems with private information and expectations feedback. The existence and uniqueness result is complemented by a convergence result for the solution of (1.2) with respect to the parameters (f , g) that allows us to formulate a stochastic maximum principle for leader-follower games of portfolio liquidation with asymmetrically informed players.
The existence and uniqueness of solutions to (1.2) is obtained via two nested continuation arguments. Standard continuation methods for McKean-Vlasov FBSDEs established in, e.g. [3, 10] do not apply to the system (1.2), due to the unknown terminal value of the backward process. In order to overcome this problem we make a linear ansatz R = AQ + H, from which we derive an exogenous BSDE with singular terminal condition for the process A, and a BSDE with known asymptotic behavior at the terminal time for the process H. The driver of the latter BSDE depends on the unbounded process A. The nature of the FBSDE for (Q, H) is different from [14] where a similar ansatz gave a BSDE with known terminal condition. Analyzing simultaneously the triple (Q, H, R) allows us to prove the fixed-point condition arising in the application of the continuation method in a suitable space.
Our second main result is a convergence result for the solution (Q, R) to the system (1.2) with respect to the "input" (f , g). Our convergence is not in the L 2 sense as in the standard FBSDE literature [23, 26] but rather in the L ν (1 < ν < 2) sense. Specifically, we consider the convergence of the solutions (Q n , R n ) to a penalized version of (1.2) under a uniform L 2 boundedness assumption on the sequence (f n , g n ). For such inputs a result of Komlós [20] guarantees the Cesaro convergence of (f n , g n ) along a subsequence in L ν (1 < ν < 2). We prove the convergence of the solutions in the same sense. To this end, we define auxiliary processes to decouple the system (1.2) and then show that these processes solve the system (1.2) in the right spaces. The convergence result then follows from the previously established uniqueness result.
Applications to optimal portfolio liquidation
Models of optimal portfolio liquidation have received substantial attention in the financial mathematics and stochastic control literature in recent years; see [5, 15, 16, 17, 21, 25] among many others. In such models, the controlled state sequence typically follows a dynamic of the form
where x ∈ R is the initial portfolio, and ξ is the trading rate. The set of admissible controls is confined to those processes ξ that satisfy almost surely the liquidation constraint X T = 0. It is typically assumed that the unaffected price process against which the trading costs are benchmarked follows some Brownian martingale S and that the trader's transaction price is given by
The integral term accounts for permanent price impact; the term η t ξ t accounts for instantaneous impact that does not affect future transactions. The trader's objective is then to minimize the cost functional
over all admissible liquidation strategies. We refer to [5, 17] for an interpretation of the processes η, κ, λ.
Single player model with expectations feedback
Standard portfolio liquidation models assume that a trader's permanent price impact is driven by his observable transactions. If the transactions are not directly observable, then it is natural to assume that the permanent impact is driven by the market's expectation about the trader's transactions as in [1, 6] , given the publicly observable information.
In Section 3 we solve a single-player liquidation model with expectations feedback where uncertainty is generated by the multi-dimensional Brownian motion W = (W , W 0 ). The Brownian motion W 0 describes a commonly observed random factor that drives market dynamics; the Brownian motion W is private information to the trader. Specifically, we assume that the trader's transaction price is given by
where S is an F 0 martingale, E[ξ s |F 0 s ] is the market's expectation about the trader's strategy, and g is an F 0 -adapted process that will be endogenized in the next subsection. Assuming a standard quadratic running cost function as in [5, 16, 17] , the objective of the trader is then to minimize the functional 4) subject to the state dynamics
We allow the cost coefficients to be private information, i.e. to be F adapted. This justifies the conditional expectation term in the price dynamics. A standard stochastic maximum principle suggests that the optimal strategy is given by 6) where X is the portfolio process, Y is the adjoint variable, and (X, Y ) solves (1.2) with f = 0, g = g:
t ] drop out of the FBSDE system, then the system reduces to that arising in the MFG analyzed in [14] . In the next subsection we introduce a model extension where the privately informed trader is the follower in a Stackelberg game of optimal portfolio liquidation. As a byproduct we obtain an extension of the MFG in [14] to a MFG with a major player. A related model without liquidation constraint and without any feedback of the major player's strategy on the minor players' transaction price has been considered in [19] .
Mean-Field type Stackelberg game with asymmetric information
In Section 4 we solve a Stackelberg game of optimal portfolio liquidation with asymmetrically informed players. The leader (she) has the first-mover advantage while the follower (he) has an informational advantage.
We assume again that uncertainty is generated by the multi-dimensional Brownian motion W = (W , W 0 ) and that W 0 describes a commonly observed market factor while W is private information to the follower. For a given F 0 -adapted strategy ξ 0 of the Stackelberg leader, we assume that the follower's liquidation problem is the same as in the previous subsection with g = κ 0 ξ 0 for some F 0 -adapted process κ 0 . Let ξ * (·) be the follower's optimal response function to the leader's strategy and put
. Following the standard approach we assume that the leader's transaction price is
The difference is that now the leader controls the transaction price both directly and indirectly through the dependence of the follower's optimal response on her trading strategy. We furthermore assume that the leader's cost functional is given by
where X 0 denotes her portfolio process and λ 0 , λ are F 0 -adapted. Her control problem is then a MFC problem with state process (X 0 , X, Y ), where (X, Y ) solves (1.7) with g = κ 0 ξ 0 and
We establish a new maximum principle for this control problem from which we derive an explicit representation of the major player's optimal control ξ 0, * as
in terms of the state equation (1.10) and the adjoint equations:
where
Here, p is the adjoint variable to X 0 and (q, r) are the adjoint variables to (Y, X). The system (1.13) is again a special case of (1.2).
In order to establish our maximum principle we first consider a sequence of unconstrained optimization problems where the liquidation constraints are replaced by increasingly penalized open positions at the terminal time. The resulting optimal strategies for the Stackelberg leader turn out to be L 2 bounded, hence they have Cesaro convergent subsequence. From this we deduce that the sequence of state-adjoint equations for the penalized problems Cesaro converges to the system (1.7), (1.10), (1.12) and (1.13).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Our general existence, uniqueness and convergence results for the FBSDE (1.2) are established in Section 2. The MFC problem and the Stackelberg game of optimal portfolio liquidation introduced above are solved in Section 3 and Section 4, respectively.
Notation and conventions. Throughout, we work on probability space (Ω, P, F ), on which there exist two independent Brownian motions W 0 and W . We denote by F 0 = (F 0 t ) 0≤t≤T and F = (F t ) 0≤t≤T the filtrations generated by W 0 and W , augmented by the P null sets, respectively, where W = (W , W 0 ). For a space I and a filtration G we introduce the following spaces:
are equipped with the respective norms
, and for β > 0 we introduce the space
, we denote by φ and φ ⋆ its upper and lower bounds, respectively. Finally, we adopt the convention that a positive constant C may vary from line to line.
The McKean-Vlasov FBSDE
In this section, we prove a general existence and uniqueness of solutions result (in a suitable space) for the FBSDE (1.2) along with the convergence result with respect to the processes (f , g). We assume throughout that the system coefficients satisfy the following assumption. Assumption 2.1.
i) The stochastic processes γ, ζ, ̺ and Λ
ii) There exist constants θ i > 0 (i = 1, 2) such that
iii) The initial condition χ belongs to
The linear ansatz R = AQ + H on [0, T ) results in the following FBSDE for the triple (Q, H, R):
where A satisfies the singular BSDE
It has been shown in [5, 17] that the equation (2.2) is well-posed under Assumption 2.1 and that the following estimate holds:
It follows from (2.3) that A is nonnegative and that for all 0 ≤ t 1 < t 2 ≤ T ,
Existence and uniqueness of solutions
In view of [14] , we expect to find a solution (Q,
F for some α > 0. Unlike in [14] the process H is only defined on [0, T ). The following heuristics suggests that if we can find a solution such that (Q,
F . In fact, by the general solution formula for linear BSDEs, for any 0 ≤ t < T < T ,
then taking the limit T ր T and using the estimate (2.4),
From this and using (2.4) again, we obtain a constant C > 0 such that for any ǫ > 0,
Since (2.5) holds for H ∈ S 2,− F our goal is to establish the existence and uniqueness of a solution
To this end, we apply a nested continuation method to the system:
In a first step, we prove the existence of a unique solution to the above system for p = 0. Subsequently, we show that the solution result extends to p = 1.
Proof. Notice that the system (2.7) is still coupled for p = 0. To solve it, we apply a continuation method to the following system:
If p = 0, then the system (2.8) is decoupled and we let H be
Moreover, by the estimate (2.4) and Doob's maximal inequality, we have for any ǫ > 0,
where C is independent of ǫ. Thus, H belongs to S
2,− F
and satisfies the SDE in (2.8).
We now turn to the process Q. Taking R = AQ + H into the SDE for Q yields,
Using monotone convergence and the estimate (2.10) this implies,
This shows that Q ∈ H α . Integration by parts for the product QR on [0, T − ǫ] yields,
Taking expectations on both sides we have
Thus, by taking ǫ → 0, from (2.3), (2.10) and (2.12) we get R ∈ L 2 F .
Step 2. If (2.8) admits a solution for some p ∈ [0, 1] and for any (b ′ , f ′ ) ∈ H α × H α−1 , then the same holds for p + d for some constant d that does not depend on p.
It remains to prove that the mapping Φ : H α → H α , Q → Q is a contraction when d is small enough and independent of p. For any Q, Q ′ ∈ H α , let ( Q, H, R) and ( Q ′ , H ′ , R ′ ) be the corresponding solutions. Integration by parts for (
Letting ǫ → 0 and choosing ε small enough, Assumption 2.1 yields,
Considering the SDE for Q in terms of R, by (2.14) we have
Since H ∈ S 2,− F , we have the following expression:
From (2.16), Doob's maximal inequality and (2.15) yield that for any ǫ > 0
where C is independent of ǫ. Finally, considering the SDE for Q in terms of H, by (2.15), (2.17) and the same argument as (2.12), we have
Thus, when d is small enough, Φ is a contraction. Iterating the argument finitely often and letting f ′ = b ′ = 0 yields the desired result.
Proof. We first prove the existence of a solution. In a second step we prove the uniqueness of solutions.
Step 1. Existence of a solution. By Lemma 2.2, the FBSDE system (2.7) admits a solution (Q,
Hence it remains to prove that if for some p ∈ [0, 1] the system (2.7) admits a solution for any f ∈ L 2 F , then the same result holds true for p + d for some small enough constant d that is independent of p. The proof is similar to proof of Lemma 2.2.
F , we introduce the following system:
F by assumption. This defines a mapping
It is sufficient to prove the existence of a fixed point of Φ. To this end, for any Q,
F , by integration by part and using the same arguments leading to the estimate (2.14),
The preceding estimate allows us to estimate Q in terms of R as follows
By (2.21), a similar argument as in (2.17) yields the existence of a uniform C such that for any ǫ > 0,
Now we return to the expression of Q in terms of H, from which we have by (2.21), (2.22) and the same argument as in (2.12) that,
By the estimates (2.20) and (2.23), when d is small enough we have a fixed point which is a solution to (2.7) when p is replaced by p + d. Iterating the argument finitely often and then taking f = 0 yields the existence of a solution.
Step 2. Uniqueness of solutions. Let us assume to the contrary that there exist two solutions (Q,
F to (2.1). As in the proof of Step 1. integration by part for (Q − Q ′ )(R − R ′ ) yields,
Secondly, by the expression of (Q − Q ′ ) in terms of R − R ′ , (2.24) yields that
Thirdly, the expression for (H − H ′ ), (2.24) and (2.25) yield that for any ǫ > 0
Finally, by the expression for (Q − Q ′ ) in terms of (H − H ′ ), (2.24), (2.25), (2.26) and arbitrariness of ǫ yield that
Remark 2.4. From the proof of Lemma 2.2 and Theorem 2.3 (see e.g. (2.9) and (2.11)), we see that for f ≡ 0, the regularity of the solution can be increased to (Q, H) ∈ H β × H ς , where ς < 1 2 ∧ β. This is the case in [14] .
The following corollary is important for the analysis of our leader-follower game of optimal portfolio liquidation analyzed below. It implies that the follower's optimal response function is linear convex and hence that the leader's control problem is convex. 
Using the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 2.3 we can also get existence of a unique solution to the "penalized version" of (2.1) where the terminal state constraint on the forward process is replaced by the terminal condition of the backward process R T = 2nQ T . To this end, we introduce the BSDE,
Existence and uniqueness of a solution to this equation has been established in [5] . Moreover, for each
When the terminal state constraint is replaced by the penalty term introduced above, the system (2.1) translates into the following system:
, where
Remark 2.7. Note that in (2.29), the terminal condition for H n is 0 so H n is defined on [0, T ]. In (2.1) the process H is only defined on [0, T ), due to to the singularity of the process A at the terminal time.
Convergence
We now prove an approximation result for the system (2.1) in terms of the systems (2.29) as n → ∞. The convergence result is established under the additional assumption that for any 0 ≤ t 1 < t 2 ≤ T ,
We refer to [14] for sufficient conditions on the model parameters under which this assumption is satisfied. 
Lemma 2.9. Let f n and g n be two sequences of stochastic processes satisfying the conditions in Lemma 2.
F and a convex combination of a subsequence of (f n , g n ) converging to (f , g) in L ν with 1 < ν < 2, i.e.,
Proof. Since the sequence (f n , g n ) is L 2 uniformly bounded, the proof of [7, Theorem 2.1] tells us there exists a subsequence of (f n , g n ) and a progressively measurable stochastic processes (f , g) such that
Fatou's lemma implies that
Thus, Vitali's convergence result implies (2.31).
The following theorem proves a convergence result for the FBSDE systems associated with the unconstrained penalized control problems to the system associated with the constrained one. The result is key to our maximum principle for the leader-follower game introduced above.
Theorem 2.10. Let (f n , g n ) be the sequence satisfying the conditions in Lemma 2.9 and
F be the limit. Let (Q n , H n , R n ) and (Q, H, R) be the solution to (2.29) and (2.1), respectively. We further assume the limit f ∈ S 2 F . Then there exists a convex combination of a subsequence of
Proof. The uniform boundedness of f n and g n implies the uniform boundedness of R n in L 2 (Lemma 2.8) and the uniform boundedness of
Thus, [7] again yields the existence of a progressively measurable process R ∈ L 2 F and a subsequence of
By (2.31), the convergence of the same convex combination holds for (f n , g n ):
lim
Define Q as the unique solution in S 2 F to the following mean field SDE in terms of the limits f and R:
Standard SDE estimates, (2.32) and (2.33) yield,
Now define H in terms of the limits f , R and Q as
(2.36) Thus, by (2.3), (2.30) and Hölder inequality,
Applying Hölder's inequality again along with Doob's maximal inequality, the uniform boundedness of (Q n , R n , f n , g n ) and the dominated convergence theorem we get,
(2.37) Let R = AQ + H. For any T < T , by (2.35) and (2.37) we have
Thus, (2.32) implies that for any T < T ,
This proves that R = R, a.e. a.s. on [0, T ] × Ω.
Thus, the limit (Q, H, R) satisfies the system (2.1). Moreover,
F . Moreover, (2.34) implies that Q ∈ S 2 F , from which (2.36) implies H ∈ S 2,− F and taking R = AQ + H into (2.34) yields Q ∈ H α . Hence, the uniqueness of solutions in
F yields the desired convergence result.
A MFC problem of optimal portfolio liquidation
In this section, we solve the single-player portfolio liquidation model with expectations feedback introduced in Section 1.2.1. We make the following assumption which implies Assumption 2.1. 
The trader's objective is to minimize the cost function J(·) introduced in (1.4) over the set of admissible controls
A standard stochastic maximum principle suggests the candidate optimal strategy is given by
F is the unique solution to the FBSDE system (1.7). Standard arguments show that ξ * ∈ A F (x). To prove that ξ * is indeed the unique optimal control, we establish an auxiliary result that substitutes for the lack of convexity of the Hamiltonian for our MFC problem.
Lemma 3.2. For every t ∈ [0, T ), we have
E κ t X t E[ξ t |F 0 t ] + η t ξ 2 t + λ t X 2 t − E κ t X * t E[ξ * t |F 0 t ] + η t (ξ * t ) 2 + λ t (X * t ) 2 ≥ E E[κ t X * t |F 0 t ] + 2η t ξ * t (ξ t − ξ * t ) + 2λ t X * t (X t − X * t ) + κ t (X t − X * t )E[ξ * t |F 0 t ] . (3.2)
Moreover, the above inequality becomes an equality if and only if
Proof. To prove (3.2), it is equivalent to show
Note that
Thus,
The second claim is obvious from the above estimate.
We are now ready to state and prove the main result of this section. Proof. To prove the optimality of the candidate strategy ξ * we fix an arbitrary control ξ ∈ A F (x) and denote by X * and X the corresponding state processes. For any ǫ > 0, it follows from Lemma 3.2 that
Integration by part yields,
(3.4)
Putting (3.4) into (3.3), we have
Letting ǫ → 0, a similar argument as the proof of [14, Theorem 2.9] yields that
In order to prove the uniqueness of optimal controls, let ξ ′ be another optimal control. Then, (3.5) yields
Thus, (3.3) holds with an equality. The second claim in Lemma 3.2 implies the uniqueness.
A Stackelberg game of optimal portfolio liquidation
In this section, we solve the Stackelberg game of optimal portfolio liquidation introduced in Section 1.2.2 above. We make the following assumption which implies Assumption 2.1 and Assumption (2.30).
The problem of the Stackelberg leader is to minimize the cost functional (1.9) over the set of admissible controls
The follower's optimal response function is given by
where (X, Y ) is the solution to (1.7) with g = κ 0 ξ 0 . We will occasionally drop the dependence on ξ 0 if there is no confusion. Under Assumption 4.1 the solution (X, Y ) enjoys better regularity properties, due to Remark 2.4 and the estimate (2.3). In the next section we first prove that the leader's problem has a unique solution if the terminal state constraints are replaced by finite penalty terms and establish a necessary maximum principle for the penalized problem. Subsequently we prove the convergence of the state and adjoint equations of the penalized problems as the degree of penalization tends to infinity.
The penalized problem: existence and maximum principle
The penalized optimization problem is obtained by replacing the terminal state constraint on the leader's and follower's state process by a finite penalty term. The leader's problem consists in minimizing the cost functional
where the optimal response for the penalized follower ξ n is defined as follows in terms of (X, Y ) in (4.3)
We are now going to show that the penalized optimization problem has a unique solution. Similar arguments could be used to prove the existence of an optimal control for the original problem. They would not, however, give us an open-loop characterization of the optimal control. 
along with Corollary 2.5 and Assumption 4.1 shows that J 0,n is strictly convex. Uniqueness of the optimal strategy follows. Let (X 0,n, * , X n, * , Y n, * ) be the solution to (4.3) associated with ξ 0,n, * . Then the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 2.10 implies,
Moreover, (4.5) yields,
Thus, Fatou's lemma and the convexity of J 0,n imply that
From now on, we denote by ξ 0,n, * the unique optimal control for the penalized optimization (4.2)-(4.3). The following theorem provides a characterization of ξ 0,n, * .
Theorem 4.4 (Necessary maximum principle).
The optimal control ξ 0,n, * admits the following representation:
where X 0,n, * , p n and q n satisfy the following FBSDE system:
−dp
Thus, the same arguments as in the proof of Lemma 2.9 yield the existence of a progressively measurable
Our goal is to prove that ξ 0, * is the leader's unique optimal strategy in the original state-constrained Stackelberg game. To this end, we first establish a representation of ξ 0, * in terms of the solution to the system (1.10), (1.12) and (1.13) by proving that the solutions to the system of state and adjoint equations (4.7) for the unconstrained penalized MFC problem Cesaro converge to the solutions to the systems (1.7), (1.10), (1.12) and (1.13). From this, we then deduce a sufficient maximum principle for the leader's MFC problem from which we conclude the optimality of the candidate strategy ξ 0, * .
Approximation
With the limit ξ 0, * at hand, we can consider the FBSDE system (1.7), (1.10), (1.12) and (1.13) with ξ 0 replaced by ξ 0, * . The system (1.7) for (X * , Y * ) is well-posed, due to Corollary 4.2. The system for (q, r) is well-posed, due to the following corollary.
Then the system (1.2) reduces (1.13). Hence, existence and uniqueness of a solution holds for (1.13) .
We now introduce two BSDEs that we expect to be the limits to the equations (4.11) and (4.12): 19) and where ξ * and ξ 0, * are defined in (4.18) and (4.14), respectively. The following lemma confirms our guess. It shows that the solutions to the FBSDE system (4.7) converge to the solutions to the FBSDE systems (1.7), (1.10), (1.13) and (4.20) in the same sense as the optimal solutions to the unconstrained penalized problems converge to the candidate solution of the constrained problem. Lemma 4.6. For 1 < ν < 2, it holds that
Proof. The convergence (4.21) follows immediately from the convergence (4.15) and the definition of 
(f n , g n ) as in (4.9) and (4.10). It follows from (4.21)-(4.23) that The preceding approximation lemma yields a representation on the candidate optimal strategy in terms of the candidate optimal state and adjoint processes akin to the maximum principle for the penalized problem. 
where p := AX 0, * + p. Moreover, ξ 0, * ∈ A F (x 0 ) and p satisfies the dynamic (1.12).
Proof. The characterization (4.28) follows immediately from Theorem 4.4 and Lemma 4.6. It remains to verify the admissibility of ξ 0, * . The fact that ξ 0, * belongs to L 2 F 0 is due to (4.14) . By the uniform boundedness (4.13), lim
which implies X 0, * T = 0 a.s.. Finally, starting from p := AX 0, * + p by integration by parts and taking into account the characterization (4.28), we know p satisfies (1.12).
Sufficient maximum principle
In this section, a sufficient maximum principle is established, from which we obtain the optimality of ξ 0, * for the leader's MFC problem. The next theorem verifies that ξ 0, * is indeed the unique optimal strategy for the leader. Proof. We denote by (X 0, * , X * , Y * ) the states corresponding to ξ 0, * and by (X 0 , X, Y ) the states corresponding to a generic strategy ξ 0 ∈ L 2 F 0 . The verification is split into three steps.
Step 1. By Corollary 2.5, X and Y are convex in ξ 0 in the sense that
Thus, J 0 is strictly convex in ξ 0 . As a result, there is at most one optimal strategy. where we recall ξ * is defined in (4.18).
Step 3. In order to prove the optimality of the strategy (4.28) we define, for any T < T the cost functional
By direct calculation we have Thus, letting T ր T , dominated convergence yields
As a corollary, we obtain that a convex combination of the value functions for the penalized optimization problems converges to the value function of the constrained problem. Proof. Recall that X 0,n k , * and ξ n k , * are the optimal state of the leader and the optimal strategy of the follower corresponding to ξ 0,n k , * , respectively. Due to the additional penalty term in the definition of J 0,n k and because ξ 0, * is an admissible strategy for the penalized problem, 1 J 0 (ξ 0,n k , * ) ≤ J 0,n k (ξ 0,n k , * ) = inf 
Conclusion
We established existence and uniqueness of solutions results for linear McKean Vlasov FBSDEs with a terminal state constraint on the forward process. The general results were used to solve novel MFC problems and mean-field leader-follower games of optimal portfolio liquidation. For the leader-follower game it could be viewed as a MFC problem where the state dynamics follows a controlled FBSDE. For such problems we proved a novel stochastic maximum principle. The proof was based on a approximation method. We proved that both the sequence of optimal solutions and the sequence of state and adjoint equations associated with a family of penalized problems Cesaro converge to a unique limit that yields the optimal solution, respectively, the adjoint equations to the original state-constrained problem. To the best of our knowledge, no numerical methods for simulating the solution to conditional McKean-Vlasov FBSDEs are yet available. It would be desirable to develop such methods in order to study the interplay between the leader's and the follower's equilibrium strategies in greater detail.
